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Recent Decisions
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - RECOMPENSE FOR lIENTAL INJURY
CAUSED BY EMOTIONAL PRESSURE
Carter v. General Motors Corporation, 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d
105 (1960)
Query: Whether the aggravation, due to emotional pressure of an
assembly line job, of a pre-existing latent mental disturbance resulting in
a mental collapse is a compensable injury within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act of the state of Michigan.
This issue was raised in Carter v. General Motors Corporation.1 Car-
ter, the plaintiff, was employed as a machine operator on assembly line
production. His job consisted of removing, one at a time, a certain part
from a table, taking it to his workbench, boring holes in it, and then
placing it on a conveyor belt. The plaintiff was unable to keep pace
with the flow of parts by taking only one at a time; therefore, he began
to remove two at a time. By so doing, he was able to keep pace, but by
replacing both of the parts on the conveyor belt at the same time, he
disrupted the coordination of the remaining sections of the assembly line.
The foreman continually reprimanded the plaintiff for doing this. The
stress and frustration caused by not being able to cope with the demands
of his job, coupled with anxiety over the possibility of losing his job, re-
sulted in his suffering a mental collapse.
The Supreme Court of Michigan held that a mental injury resulting
from emotional pressure is a compensable injury within the Work-
men's Compensation Act of Michigan. However, compensation was
awarded only for the period that the claimant was unable to work.
An analysis of the philosophy of the workmen's compensation acts
and of the judicial requirements for compensation thereunder substanti-
ates the declaration of the Michigan Supreme Court that this decision was
based on precedent and logic.' The objective of the workmen's compen-
sation acts is to provide compensation for employees and their families
when such employees are disabled as a result of an injury incurred in the
course of employment.' Society is seeking to place the burden for work-
caused injuries upon the industry that has caused them, rather than on
the workmen and public welfare. It is reasoned that by forcing industry
1. 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960).
2. "In due course we shall examine the authorities so holding, including decisions of this
Court made venerable by age and by the compelling logic of their reasoning, for it is upon
those past decisions of this Court that our decision in this case is firmly planted." Id. at 580,
106 N.W.2d at 105.
3. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 1.00 (1952).
Workmen's Compensation
to bear the financial burden for those who are injured, industry will take
adequate precautions to prevent such injuries.4  However, workmen's
compensation is not social insurance. The employer is not a guarantor
of the health of his employees. A causal relationship must be established
between the injury and the employment in order that the injury be com-
pensable.5 At the same time, tort law doctrines of causal relationship are
not to be applied in determining the right of compensation. The com-
pensation acts were passed to remedy a situation that tort law was too
inflexible to meet.'
Criteria for Compensation
The workmen's compensation statutes of the various states establish
criteria which the injured workmen must meet in order to qualify for
compensation.' The task of interpreting the "magic words," that is, the
criteria of the statutes, is left to the courts and administrative boards.
The statutes are thereby defined according to case by case application of
the statutory language to a given fact situation. As the nature of indus-
try is changing, the types of accidents that occur in industry also are
changing. Therefore, the early interpretations of the "magic words" are,
in many cases, no longer appropriate. Thus, the courts are faced with
the alternatives: (1) refusing compensation, basing their decision on
precedent that was established before automation, or (2) abandoning
the old criteria and establishing new standards. The courts are hesitant
in doing the latter because of the lack in many instances of legislative
directive.
The intangibles of economic and political pressure operate on the
courts in their interpretation of the statutes. For example, in Michigan,
where the supreme court justices are elected, the Republican justices con-
sistently vote against granting compensation while the Democratic jus-
tices consistently vote for it.'
The definitions set forth in the compensation acts of the states vary
to some degree, but in general, the requirements of a compensable injury
are:
4. Horovitz, Workmen's Compensation Law: Review of Leading Current Cases, 19 NACCA
,.J. 34, 41 (1957). Lloyd George, the Prime Minister of England, supposedly campaigned
for the passage of a workmen's compensation act with the slogan, "The cost of the product
should bear the blood of the workman." PROSSER, ToRTs 383 (2d ed. 1955).
5. HoRovrz, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COmPENSAON LAWs 147
(1944) [hereinafter cited as HoRovrrzj.
6. Id. at 8. See 1 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S CoMPENSATTON TEXT § 6 (1941, Supp.
1958); 35 NOTRE DA ME LAw. 471 (1960). Prior to the acts the common-law tort doctrines
of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant rule were effective
bats to recovery by an injured workman. PROSSER, TORTs § 68 (2d ed. 1955).
7. HoRovrrz 72.
8. Downing, Workmen's Compensation, 1959 Survey of Michigan Law, 6 WAYNE L. REV.
144, 151 (1959).
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A personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment.9 (Emphasis added.)
"Accident"
The standard definition of "accident" as used in the workmen's com-
pensation acts is:
[A] sudden, unusual, unexpected - or unlooked for mishap or an
untoward event which is not expected or designed .... 1 0
In the Carter case the court was not faced with the problem of
whether the injury was "accidental" because the word "accident" had been
removed from the body of the Michigan statute by a 1943 amendment.
The fact that "accident" had been allowed to remain in the title of the
statute was not, according to a 1957 supreme court ruling,1 indicative of
a legislative intent to have the term "accident" control the meaning of
the act.'"
In some states the courts have read the word "accidental" into the
definition of "injury" even though the statutes make no mention of the
word. In essence this is what the courts of Ohio have done.' The
Workmen's Compensation Act of Ohio until its amendment in 1959
defined "injury" as including
any injury received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured
employee's employment.14
However, the Ohio courts in applying the above definition have devel-
oped a more restrictive one:
"Injury" comprehends a physical or traumatic injury, accidental in its
origin and cause; the result of a sudden happening occurring by chance,
unexpectedly, and not in the usual course of events at a particular time.15
9. HoRovrrz 72.
10. Id. at 84.
11. Sheppard v. Michigan Natel Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 83 N.W.2d 614 (1957).
12. Downing, Workmen's Compensation, 1957 Survey of Michigan Law, 4 WAYNE L. REV.
155, 161 (1958).
13. OHIO CONST. art II, § 35: "For the purpose of providing compensation to workmen
and their dependents for death, injuries, or occupational diseases occasioned in the course of
a workman's employment .... " Davis v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 168 Ohio St. 482,
486, 155 N.E.2d 889, 892 (1959) (Taft, J., dissenting opinion) (A tire builder strained
his back while attempting to remove a tire from a mold. The court refused compensation.);
Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, 164 Ohio St. 297, 130 N.E.2d 807 (1955) (Plaintiff con-
tracted pneumonia while working in wet weather, and his death resulted from this. The
court denied compensation.); 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 37.10(1952): ". . . Ohio, has no reference to 'accident' anywhere in the statute, but read the re-
quirement in anyway."
14. 103 Ohio Laws 79, § 21 (1913).
15. Jones & Tucker, Workmen's Compensation in the Ohio Supreme Court to 1956, at 39
(1957) (unpublished thesis in Western Reserve Law School Library). See Shea v. Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co., 139 Ohio St. 407, 40 N.E.2d 669 (1942); Vogt v. Industrial
Comm'n, 138 Ohio St. 233, 34 N.E.2d 197 (1941); Spicer Mfg. Co. v. Tucker, 127 Ohio St.
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This definition incorporates the requirement that the injury be "accident-
al' though the statute makes no mention of such a requirement. In 1959
the Workmen's Compensation Act was amended and "injury" was re-
defined:
"Injury" includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental
means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of,
and arising out of a workman's employment.' 6
The legislature seems to have adopted the requirement of "accident," but
has attempted to give it a somewhat broader definition than that given
to it by the courts. The requirement in Ohio that the injury be accidental
barred recovery in Toth v. Standard Oil Company.'" In that case the
claimant suffered a stroke caused by the aggravation of a pre-existing
nervous injury when the police questioned him about an accident in the
course of his employment. The court held that such an injury was not
compensable because it was not "accidental" within the definition given
to that word by the courts. 8 "Accidental" in the Toth case only involved
the problem of a physical injury caused by emotional pressure, whereas in
the Carter case there was the added problem of a mental injury caused by
emotional pressure. This fact, plus the fact that the word "accidental"
was included in the 1959 amendment to the Ohio Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, makes it improbable that the Ohio courts would allow com-
pensation in a situation similar to that in the Carter case.'" Thus, the use
or nonuse of the first magic word under consideration, "accidental," is
most important in attempting to forecast a state's policy toward work-
men's compensation claims based upon mental injuries.
'Injury"
The second "magic word" of the workmen's compensation statutes is
"injury." The precise problem presented in the Carter case is whether
"injury" includes mental as well as physical injury.20 A broad definition
of "injury" is:
"Personal injury" includes any harmful change in the body. It need not
involve physical trauma, but it may include such injuries as disease, sun-
421, 188 N.E 870 (1934); Renkel v. Industrial Comm'n, 109 Ohio St. 152, 141 N.E. 834
(1923); Industrial Comm'n v. Roth, 98 Ohio St. 34, 120 N.E. 172 (1918).
16. OuIo REv. CoDn 5 4123.01 (c) (Supp. 1960).
17. 160 Ohio St. 1, 113 N.E.2d 81 (1953).
18. Id. at 2, 113 N.E.2d at 81.
19. In the case of McNees v. Cincinnati St. Ry., 90 Ohio App. 223, 101 N.E.2d 1 (1951),
the court held that mental strain or worry could be an injury under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. However, mental injuries are usually caused by a series of incidents, and not by a
sudden occurrence. Whether the new definition of "injury" promulgated by the Ohio legis.
lature would include such injuries remains to be determined.
20. Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 585, 106 N.W.2d 105, 109 (1960).
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stroke, nervous collapse, traumatic neurosis, hysterical paralysis, and
neurasthenia.2 1
Many courts have refused to accept such a broad definition in dealing
with mental injuries and instead have incorporated the requirement of
"impact." They are borrowing this concept from the field of torts. The
"impact" theory states that recovery will not be granted for mental in-
jury unless there has been some physical contact with the person of the
plaintiff.2
In the recent case of Chernin v. Progress Service Company,"3 a taxi-
cab driver involved in an accident within the course of employment be-
came mentally ill after being questioned by the police. The argument
with the police and their questions aggravated a pre-existing mental ill-
ness. A New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, refused compen-
sation because the plaintiff's mental injury was not caused by any physi-
cal contact and therefore he did not suffer an "injury" within the mean-
ing of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Commentators on this case
severely criticized the decision for applying the tort doctrine of "impact"
in determining whether a mental injury was compensable. 4
The refusal of a court to grant compensation for a mental injury
caused by mental stimulus on the basis that it was not caused by physical
contact is a failure to take cognizance of medical facts. Medicine recog-
nizes that mental disorders can be caused by psychic trauma, and are as
real as mental injuries caused by physical trauma. 5 The case of Bailey
v. American General Insurance Company"6 succinctly states the argument
for defining "injury" as including mental injury:
The ... "physical structure of the body" . . . refers to the whole, to
the complex of perfectly integrated and interdependent bones, tissues
and organs .. . . [It] should be considered that of a living person
not as a static, inanimate thing.27
Michigan courts have long permitted compensation for mental injury
caused by physical trauma, shock, or fright.2s They have abolished the
21. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN's COMPENSATION LAW § 42.00 (1952).
22. PROSSER, TORTS 178 (2d ed. 1955).
23. 9 App. Div. 2d 170, 192 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1959).
24. See 17 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 260 (1960). See also 20 MD. L. REV. 86 (1960).
25. Coon, Psychiatry for the Lawyer: The Principal Psychosis, 31 CORNELL L.Q. 327
(1946); Goodrich, Emotional Disturbances as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV. 497 (1922).
26. 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955). In this case the claimant received a severe
nervous shock when one end of a scaffold collapsed and his fellow worker fell to his death.
Claimant was saved from a similar fate when he became entangled in the supporting cables.
Thereafter claimant was unable to return to his usual work because of a nervous condition.
The court held that the injury was compensable.
27. Id. at 436, 279 S.W.2d at 318.
28. Klein v. Len H. Darling Co., 217 Mich. 485, 187 N.W. 400 (1922) (An employee suf-
fering from a nervous condition allowed a radiator to slip from his grip and fall to the next
floor. It struck another employee. The claimant received a shock because of the belief that
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requirement that there must be a physical injury, and have held that both
mental and physical injuries are within the meaning of the Michigan
statutory word "injury." 9 But the Carter case does present one twist that
distinguishes it from previous Michigan cases - instead of one single
event causing the injury or aggravating the pre-existing injury, it was a
series of stimuli over a period of time. The court held that the act did
not limit recovery to only single event injuries.
Section 1 of part 2 [of the Michigan statute] ... provides for a "'date
of injury' .. , in the case of an injury not attributable to a single event",
evidencing a legislative intent that such injuries should be compensable.30
(Emphasis added.)
In general, compensation is permitted for the aggravation of a pre-
existing injury. The general doctrine is that "employers take workmen
... without any warranty as to previous state of health, known or un-
known."'" In Redfern v'. Sparks-Withington Company"2 the Michigan
Supreme Court held that the general rule applies to pre-existing mental
injuries as well:
[P]re-existing disease [in this case emotional disturbance] does not bar
recovery of workmen's compensation when subsequent occupational
injury aggravates the condition to the point of disability or precipitates
the disability s
"In the Course of Employment"
The third consideration in the discussion of the "magic words" is
"arising out of and in the course of." This is the requirement of causal
relationship. In most states a claim based upon mental injury caused by
emotional aggravation is not held to be "accidental" within the meaning
of the workmen's compensation statutes, nor is it considered a compen-
sable "injury" under such statutes. In these jurisdictions, whether or not
there was a causal relationship is not even considered. In the Carter case
the Michigan Supreme Court had eliminated the first two "magic words"
and was only concerned with causation. The court said that it was
he had killed his co-employee, became delirious, and died. The court granted compensation.);
Karwachi v. General Motors Corp., 293 Mich. 355, 292 N.W. 328 (1940) (Plaintiff burned
his thumb which later became infected. The anguish caused by this condition aggravated a
pre-existing latent mental disturbance and the plaintiff suffered a nervous collapse. The
court granted compensation.); Hayes v. Detroit Steel Casting Co., 328 Mich. 609, 44 N.W.2d
190 (1950) (Plaintiff suffered an injury to his left eye resulting in its removal. Subse-
quently he suffered from traumatic neurosis, i.e., brooding over the loss. Compensation was
granted.).
29. Rainko v. Webster-Eisenlohr Inc., 306 Mich. 328, 10 N.W.2d 903 (1943).
30. Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 593, 106 N.W.2d 105, 113 (1960);
accord, La Veck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 190 Mich. 604, 157 N.W. 72 (1916).
31. HoRovrrz 82.
32. 353 Mich. 286, 91 N.W.2d 516 (1958).
33. Id. at 299, 91 N.W.2d at 518.
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bound by competent evidence which established a causal relationship and
proved disability had been suffered. 4 The defendant did not rebut the
testimony of the plaintiff's doctor and, therefore, the court had to accept
the finding of fact by the lower court.
Conclusion
Many courts have failed to see behind the "magic words" of the stat-
ute to the heart of the problem."5 Recovery of workmen's compensa-
tion should not depend on whether a certain fact situation fits within the
statutory definition of "injury" or "accidental" as interpreted by past
courts. It should depend on causal relationship, liberally construed and
proven by competent testimony. A denial of compensation for a work-
caused injury because it does not fit within the "magic words" evolved
by the courts is a failure to take cognizance of industrial change. The
Carter case is an excellent illustration of a court's ability to escape from
a bog of outmoded doctrines and readjust itself to a changing industrial
technology.
ALAN J. SHAPIRO
34. Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 585, 106 N.W.2d 105, 113 (1960).
35. E.g., Star Publishing Co. v. Jackson, 115 Ind. App. 221, 58 N.E.2d 202 (1944); Voss.
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 14 N.J. Misc. 791, 187 At. 334 (Workmen's Comp. Bureau 1936).
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